The Hands That Guard The Ayatollah Khamenei

There are fears that more executions on similar charges are in the offing, with Iran’s Fars 카지노 사이트 Agency reporting that over 700 people have been detained on charges of being “Israeli mercenaries”.

Perhaps the Iranian government is apprehensive of a major public revolt, similar to the 2022 mass protests over the killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in police custody after she was arrested for not wearing the hijab. The travesty sparked a wave of protests across the country, leading to the death of over 500 people and the detention of over 20,000 protestors.

Many of the problems facing Iranian society today spring from the severe draconian measures adopted by the theocratic regime, particularly against supporters of secular and liberal democracy, minority rights and gender equality.

Institutionalised Theocracy

Unlike most countries in West Asia that do not have a comprehensive or written constitution—like Saudi Arabia and Israel—Iran drafted and ratified a theocratic constitution for itself after a referendum in 1979, which combines a unique set of Islamic and pseudo-democratic provisions.

Called ‘Qanun-e Asasi-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslâmi-ye Iran’ in Persian (Fundamental Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran), the constitution provides a foundation for the institutional framework and procedural functioning of the regime.

The written document has been instrumental in giving an ideological and political base for the theocratic state, which has helped it maintain a vice-like grip upon the nation—notwithstanding recurrent internal unrest, economic hardships and several wars fought over the last four-and-a-half decades.

The cardinal principle of Iran’s political ideology is Ayatollah Khomeini’s interpretation of the Twelver Shi’ah (Ithna Ashariyya) concept of ‘Velayat-e Faqih’ (or the guardianship of the Islamic jurist), which bestows significant powers to the Supreme Leader, who is generally known as ‘Rahbar’—or more formally as ‘Rahbar-e-Moazzam Inquilab-e-Islami Iran’.

Though Iran has an elected president and parliament, the Supreme Leader—who has to be an eminent Islamic jurist—enjoys an ascendance over them and oversees all branches of government to ensure their adherence to Islamic principles.

However, the Supreme Leader is not constitutionally above the law, and is himself appointed by an ‘Assembly of Experts of the Leadership’ (‘majlis-e-khobargan-e-rahbari’). Generally appointed for life, the Supreme Leader can be removed from power by the Assembly of Experts in case he is found incapable of fulfilling his duties, loses the necessary qualifications, or is found to have never possessed the required qualifications.

The institution of the Assembly of Experts also facilitates smooth transition of power in the event of the death or incapacity of the Supreme Leader from performing his duties. This makes any plans by a foreign adversary to bring about immediate regime change by assassinating the Supreme Leader somewhat far-fetched.

It is noteworthy that all members of the Assembly of Experts are themselves vetted and approved by another, and even more powerful political body called the Guardian Council (‘Shoura-e-Nigehban’), whose members are, in turn, appointed by the Supreme Leader himself. This illustrates a closed system run by a theocratic clique, claiming to be leaders of a republic.

The Guardian Council consists of 12 members—six Islamic jurists (theologians) and six legal experts—who have summary power to veto legislation passed by parliament (called ‘Majlis-e-Shoura-e Islami’); manage and supervise the holding of elections as well as approve or disqualify candidates running for elections at the local, parliamentary, presidential and the Assembly of Experts levels.

The Guardian Council has often been accused of disqualifying electoral candidates whose actions have led to repeated public discontent and mass unrest. In January 2016, the Guardian Council disqualified up to 40 per cent of more than 12,000 candidates hoping to contest in that year’s parliamentary elections. Then, on June 18, 2021, the council disqualified 585 prospective presidential candidates, including the highly popular former adviser to the Supreme Leader and parliament speaker, Ali Larijani.

IRGC: The Military Pillar of the Theocracy

However, the central pillar, which works as a bulwark for protection of the Iranian regime, is the ‘Pasdaran’ or ‘Sipah’, better known in the English-speaking world as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This religiously indoctrinated military force was raised by Ayatollah Khomeini himself in 1979 to save the Islamic Revolution, and it holds critical political, military, and economic power in support of the theocratic state.

Operating alongside the regular army (known as ‘Artesh’) and the police command (‘Faraja’), the IRGC serves as a multi-service elite branch of the Iranian Armed Forces, having its own ground forces, airspace force (including missile power, air force and a space wing), navy, the Quds Force (for extra-territorial military intelligence operations and supporting proxies), the Basij (a civil militia of young volunteers) and an intelligence wing with a dedicated cyber command.

The IRGC is mandated with an ideological mission of jihad, meant for extending the sovereignty of Islamic law throughout the world. Unlike the regular Iranian army, whose primary objective is to protect Iran’s borders, the IRGC’s principal mission is to protect the country’s ruling clergy and to promote the Revolution abroad, while protecting it at home.

Since the Green Movement (jonbash sabz)—which arose after the disputed 2009 presidential election—the Iranian regime has developed specialised domestic security units in the IRGC, particularly its Basij forces with enhanced surveillance both on the streets and online.

The theological narratives of the Twelver Shi’ah are used to indoctrinate the IRGC soldiers, which leaves an ideological, doctrinal and strategic impact on their modes of warfare. Heavily radicalised with ‘Alavi’ (related to Imam Ali), ‘Ashurai’ (related to Ashura mourning on the 10th day of Muharram) and Mahdist (those awaiting the coming of Imam Mahdi) strains, the IRGC has been branded as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the US and some of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.

The belief that Imam Ali, the first divinely ordained Shia Imam, was unsuccessful in his campaign in the Battle of Siffin in 657 CE because of lack of loyalty by his army, is used by the IRGC to indoctrinate total obedience of its soldiers for Iran’s Supreme Leader.

In addition, the commemoration of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom in the face of certain defeat underlines the Ashura spirit of dying for a righteous cause, and thus a religious tradition is used to motivate soldiers to keep fighting for the Supreme Leader under any circumstance.

The third ideological strain is messianic, and relates to the prophesied coming of the Mahdi in the end-times, which many Iranian leaders insist is close at hand and link it to their nation’s ongoing war with Israel and the West.

These Shia religious narratives have been implicitly exploited by the regime in inculcating unquestionable loyalty of even the citizenry towards the leadership. The glorification of martyrdom and sacrifice as well as the spirit of stoic resignation in trying times are used to control a hapless populace enduring severe political and economic hardship.

Corrupt ‘Bonyad’ System and Problems with Judiciary

In addition, the ‘Bonyad system’ of charitable trusts plays a significant role in consolidating the regime’s stranglehold over the nation. These organisations are owned and managed by government officials and clerics as they carry out various economic activities—including manufacturing, trading, and real estate development.

In fact, the ‘Bonyad’ system of trusts and their businesses comes second only to the oil industry in its contribution to the national GDP. Still, it lacks transparency and oversight as its owners—usually top clerics and government officials—remain accountable only to the Supreme Leader. Thus, economic power lies in the hands of the political and economic elite. Amidst rampant poverty, corruption and unemployment, the youth tend to favour joining the government or the military, where pay scales are higher. This helps the state to exercise greater control over the population.

However, it must be also conceded that Iran’s economy has exhibited some diversification with the hydrocarbon sector contributing less than a quarter to the country’s GDP today, even as manufacturing, the tech sector and agriculture show a notable uptick in recent years. Still, inflation remains very high—the cost of a loaf of bread was reportedly 100,000 Iranian Rials in Tehran in January this year.

Iran’s judicial system has also come in for a lot of international criticism for its imposition of harsh punishments, gender inequality, failure to uphold human rights and lack of due process. A unique blend of Islamic law (Sharia) mixed with elements of civil law often causes confusion, while flogging—particularly for women not wearing the veil—and amputation of limbs—particularly for thieves—are reported to be common. The judicial system is also accused of being inquisitorial in its approach, with judges blamed for acting as prosecutors and arbiters.

Wars and Sanctions Only Help the Regime

In conclusion, Iran’s brand of Islamist rule is more collectivist in outlook that does not prioritise individual freedom and basic human rights. As religion helps in binding society and independent religious charities help alleviate some of the shortcomings of state programmes, issues of governance remain unaddressed. The crippling impact of foreign sanctions affects the masses, but not the religious plutocracy.

In fact, the regime uses religious rhetoric and creates a perception of major foreign policy and defence policy successes to placate the inured masses. The continued refrain by foreign powers to bring down the regime also helps the government in standing up for the pride of the nation and in rallying even the aggrieved citizenry to its side.

(Views expressed are personal)

Adil Rasheed is research fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute For Defence Studies And Analyses

This article is part of 카지노 Magazine's July 11, 2025 issue, Making Bombing Great Again. It appeared in print as 'The Hands That Guard The Ayatollah'.